

DIPLOMATIC MEMORANDA OF KAHARAGIA

**Diplomatic Memorandum on the Status and
Recognition of Abkhazia**

DM-2026-002



Diplomatic Memorandum on the Status and Recognition of Abkhazia

*Abkhaz self-determination, displaced communities and freedom from external
control*

SECRETARIAT OF STATE, SECTION II — FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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Issued by the Secretariat of State, Section II — Foreign Affairs. A Diplomatic Memorandum states the position of the State of Kaharagia on a question of recognition or contested sovereignty, the grounds on which that position rests, and the reservations to which it is subject. Recognition, accreditation, immunity and privilege are conferred by the appropriate Sovereign instrument; this publication records the position those instruments give effect to.

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The Determination

POSITION OF THE STATE

Kaharagia recognises the statehood of Abkhazia with express reservations;
Kaharagia does not establish diplomatic relations at this time

SELF-DETERMINATION	Recognised. The Abkhaz people possess a genuine right to determine their political status.
FAMILY OF CLAIM	Separation from a settled state, the heaviest burden under DM-2026-001.
EXTERNAL CONTROL	Effective control, found by the Strasbourg Court. Not absorption: the trajectory does not run toward incorporation and refusal of the patron is demonstrated.
STATE RECOGNITION	Extended, subject to express reservations. Disposition: recognition with reservations.
GOVERNMENT	The incumbent authorities are treated as the de facto administration; recognition is not an endorsement of any institution or office-holder.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS	Not established. Recognition and relations are separate decisions.
TERRITORIAL RESERVATION	Without prejudice to boundaries negotiated with Georgia, the rights of displaced persons, or property claims.

COMMON DOCTRINAL BASIS

A people's right to self-determination is not extinguished by an inherited border. Nor is it fulfilled by foreign occupation, coerced integration, ethnic cleansing, demographic engineering, or a nominal independence maintained under another state's effective control. Recognition of a state is separate from endorsement of its government and from the establishment of diplomatic relations.

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1. Executive Position

Kaharagia recognises the Republic of Abkhazia as a state and does not establish diplomatic relations with it at this time. These are two decisions, and this publication answers them differently. Recognition rests on three findings: the Abkhaz are a distinct people with a sustained national claim; their institutions have endured for more than three decades; their refusal to be governed from Tbilisi has been plainly demonstrated. Recognition affirms that Abkhazia is entitled to be independent of both Georgia and the Russian Federation. It is not an endorsement of Russia's regional policy.

Among the five dispositions in DM-2026-001, this publication closes on recognition with reservations. That disposition is available because no duty of non-recognition arises. The Security Council has addressed Abkhazia repeatedly and has reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia while calling for the status of Abkhazia to be defined in accordance with those principles. It has not called upon States to withhold recognition, and no instrument doing so is before the Secretariat. The contrast with DM-2026-008 is exact and it decides the form of this answer rather than its substance.

The reservations attached to this recognition are not decoration. The mass displacement of Georgians from Abkhazia cannot be treated as a completed demographic fact that removes them from the political and moral community of the territory. Russian military presence and structural dependency also constrain present-day Abkhaz sovereignty. Kaharagia recognises the state while requiring that its independence become genuine and rights-respecting. Withholding diplomatic relations is what keeps that requirement real.

1.1 Abkhaz Statehood Recognised, Relations Withheld

Abkhazia is a case where the four decisions of the doctrine come apart sharply, and the answers do not run together:

- **The right of self-determination.** Recognised. The Abkhaz people possess a genuine right to determine their political status.
- **Statehood.** Recognised, subject to the reservations below.
- **Government.** The incumbent authorities are treated as the de facto administration. Recognition is not an endorsement of any institution or office-holder, and expresses no view on how those offices were filled.
- **Diplomatic relations.** Not established. Recognition and relations are separate decisions, and the second is withheld.

The doctrine also requires each case to be placed in a family of claim before any further test is applied, and provides that classification is a question of history which neither party may choose. No earlier Abkhaz external sovereignty is established in the material before the Secretariat, and the claim as pressed is not the restoration of one. The case falls in the third family, separation from a settled state, which carries the heaviest burden. On the doctrine's scale of dependency, effective control and absorption, the degree found is effective control. That finding shifts the burden to Abkhazia rather

than answering the question, and the four indicators by which the burden is tested are applied below.

2. Self-Determination, the Expulsion and the Limits of Abkhaz Sovereignty

The Abkhaz claim cannot honestly be described as an invention of the Russian Federation or as a dispute that began in 2008. It was pressed as a party claim, in negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations, fourteen years before any state recognised Abkhazia. On 4 April 1994 the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed at Moscow a Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, in the presence of the United Nations, the Russian Federation and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Paragraph 6 of that declaration provides that Abkhazia shall have its own constitution and legislation and appropriate state symbols, such as anthem, emblem and flag.

The same declaration shows what an internal settlement was going to look like. Paragraph 7 records that the parties had reached a mutual understanding regarding powers for joint action in foreign policy and foreign economic ties, border guard arrangements, customs, energy, transport and communications, ecology, and the securing of human and civic rights and freedoms and the rights of national minorities. Those are the powers of a federal or confederal arrangement, agreed in outline by both sides. Georgia's claim to govern the Abkhaz does not rest only on the external boundary of the Georgian Soviet republic, and Kaharagia does not treat Abkhaz aspirations as legally irrelevant because of that inheritance.

The doctrine's test for external self-determination asks whether a durable, rights-respecting and freely chosen order remains possible within the existing state. The 1994 outline was never completed. In resolution 1065 (1996) of 12 July 1996 the Security Council expressed its deep concern at the continued deadlock in the efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement, and noted the continued failure by the parties to resolve their differences owing to the uncompromising position taken by the Abkhaz side. Thirty years later the position is not a deadlock in a live negotiation. It is the absence of one.

What exists in its place does not reach the question. The Geneva International Discussions have met since 15 October 2008 under the co-chairmanship of the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and had held sixty-six rounds by March 2026. They address security and the return of displaced persons. The Secretary-General reported on 4 May 2026 that although all participants in Working Group II agreed that the return of internally displaced persons and refugees should be kept on the agenda, there was neither substantial discussion of nor progress on the matter, and that walkouts by some participants under that agenda item continued. A forum whose participants leave the room when return is raised is not a route to a negotiated status.

Recognition does not require Kaharagia to accept every official Abkhaz historical claim, and it does not bind the Abkhaz to their present course. They must be able to decide whether they seek independence, association, confederation or another

relationship without military coercion from any side.

2.1 The 1992–1993 Expulsion and the Electorate That Remained

The 1992–1993 war involved grave violations by more than one party. The principal contemporaneous record before the Secretariat is an investigation published by Human Rights Watch in March 1995, which documents indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, ethnically motivated violence, hostage-taking and pillage by Georgian and by Abkhaz forces, and finds deliberate efforts by each to force the population of the other party's ethnic group out of strategic areas. Abkhaz civilians experienced killings, pillage and the destruction of cultural institutions during Georgian military operations. Georgian civilians experienced organised terror, killing and mass expulsion as Abkhaz forces prevailed.

The scale is established across the record and by different kinds of body. Human Rights Watch recorded approximately 200,000 people displaced, predominantly Georgians, in a mass exodus at the end of 1993, and their subsequent inability to return unconditionally. The General Assembly, in resolution 62/249 of 15 May 2008, deplored practices of arbitrary forced displacement and recorded its deep concern at the humanitarian situation created by the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of persons from Abkhazia, Georgia. In the same resolution it recalled the conclusions of the Budapest, Lisbon and Istanbul summits of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and in particular the reports of ethnic cleansing and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in Abkhazia. Those summit conclusions are political findings of a regional organisation, recalled by a recommendatory organ. They are not adjudication, and this publication does not present them as such.

Forced displacement, population transfer and the exclusion of displaced residents may not produce the population whose vote is then invoked as self-determination. Kaharagia does not argue that a vote among the population that remained proves independence was freely chosen. Present institutions and votes are not treated as self-validating when the electorate was transformed by wartime expulsion. Recognition here rests on the endurance of an Abkhaz political community, on the demonstrated capacity of that community to refuse its patron, and on the absence of any free route back to Georgian rule. It does not rest on the arithmetic of a post-war electorate.

Two consequences follow, both operative. The recognised state inherits obligations to all lawful residents and displaced communities of the territory. And the displaced remain part of the political community of the territory for any future status question. By resolution 80/264, adopted at its 88th plenary meeting on 4 June 2026 by 107 votes to 8 with 55 abstentions, the General Assembly recognised the right of return of all internally displaced persons and refugees and their descendants, regardless of ethnicity, to their homes throughout Georgia, including in Abkhazia; stressed the need to respect their property rights and to refrain from obtaining property in violation of those rights; and reaffirmed the unacceptability of forced demographic changes. A resolution of the General Assembly is a recommendation. Kaharagian recognition is nonetheless subordinate to the right it states and may not be pleaded against it.

The Security Council put the governing rule in a form that binds this publication directly. In resolution 1065 (1996) it reaffirmed the right of all refugees and displaced

persons affected by the conflict to return to their homes in secure conditions, condemned the continued obstruction of that return by the Abkhaz side, and stressed the unacceptability of any linkage of the return of refugees and displaced persons with the question of the political status of Abkhazia. Return is not a concession to be traded for status, and status is not a currency in which return may be paid. Kaharagia holds both halves of that sentence against both parties and against itself.

The obligations Kaharagia attaches to recognition are not Kaharagian inventions, and the Abkhaz side is not being asked to accept a standard written for it by strangers. It signed that standard. The Quadripartite Agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, concluded at Moscow on the same day as the 1994 declaration between the Abkhaz and Georgian sides, the Russian Federation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, provides that displaced persons have the right to return voluntarily to their places of origin or residence irrespective of their ethnic, social or political affiliation, under conditions of complete safety, freedom and dignity; that they shall have the right to return peacefully without risk of arrest, detention, imprisonment or legal criminal proceedings, subject to stated exceptions for serious evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes, and persons serving in armed formations preparing to fight in Abkhazia; that returnees shall enjoy freedom of movement and the right to return to the areas where they lived; that their expired documents shall be extended and validated for their previous place of residence or their elected place of return; that they shall be protected from harassment, including unauthorised charges or fees and threats to life or property; that they shall recover the movable and immovable property they left behind or, where that is not feasible, receive appropriate compensation through a mechanism established by the quadripartite Commission; and that a mechanism shall be established for family reunification. The parties agreed to begin the repatriation operation with the Gali region.

Return may require security arrangements, local autonomy, international monitoring, property commissions, compensation and phased implementation. It cannot be dismissed as politically difficult, imposed collectively on people who do not want it, or turned into the exclusion of those who stayed. The Secretary-General states the reason in terms Kaharagia adopts: return is both a human right and a humanitarian issue, cannot be directly linked to political questions or to the conclusion of peace agreements, and must be addressed irrespective of any solution to the underlying conflict.

2.2 Genuine Sovereignty and the Character of the Effective-Control Finding

The doctrine asks whether a nominally independent state can govern, choose its alliances, control its security institutions and alter its foreign policy without a patron's permission. Dependency alone does not make a state unreal, and this publication does not dispute that Abkhazia is dependent. What decides the question is whether the freedom to refuse, renegotiate or terminate survives.

The European Court of Human Rights answered the first half of that question in its Grand Chamber judgment of 21 January 2021 in *Georgia v. Russia (II)*, which was final on delivery under Article 44 of the Convention. The Court held that the Russian Fed-

eration exercised effective control over South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the buffer zone during the period from 12 August to 10 October 2008, the date of the official withdrawal of Russian troops, and that after that period the strong Russian presence and the South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities' dependency on the Russian Federation indicated that there had been continued effective control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It held by sixteen votes to one that Georgian nationals prevented from returning to South Ossetia or Abkhazia fell within Russian jurisdiction, and by sixteen votes to one that there had been an administrative practice contrary to Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 as regards the inability of Georgian nationals to return to their homes, a situation still running on 23 May 2018, the date of the hearing on the merits.

The Court has since applied the same attribution to conduct at the boundary itself. In its principal judgment of 9 April 2024 in *Georgia v. Russia (IV)* it found a pattern or system of violations by Russia arising from the hardening of the administrative boundary lines after 2008, comprising excessive use of force, ill-treatment, unlawful detention, unlawful restrictions on access to homes, land and families, unlawful restrictions on day-to-day movement across the boundary line, and denial of the right to education in Georgian. On 14 October 2025 a Chamber of seven judges awarded 253,018,000 euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage suffered by more than 29,000 victims of that pattern, including 5,172,000 euros for the unlawful detention of at least 2,586 ethnic Georgians by Russian or de facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian forces following arrest for a border violation, 224,250,000 euros for restrictions on the access of at least 23,000 ethnic Georgians to their homes, land and families, and 20,000,000 euros for the denial of education in Georgian to at least 4,000 people. The Russian Government took no part in those proceedings, and the Court worked from the material submitted by Georgia after satisfying itself that the claims were substantiated. The Court attributed acts of de facto Abkhaz forces to the Russian Federation, and Kaharagia records the attribution as the Court made it.

That award is not a settled sum. The press release issued by the Registrar records that under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention a Chamber judgment is not final when it is delivered. Within three months of delivery any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; a panel of five judges then considers whether the case deserves further examination; if the referral is granted the Grand Chamber hears the case and delivers the final judgment, and if the request is refused the Chamber judgment becomes final on that day. Nothing before the Secretariat records whether a referral was sought here. The finding of effective control on which this publication rests comes from the Grand Chamber judgment of 2021 and does not depend on the sums awarded in 2025.

A finding of effective control allocates responsibility. It tells the Court whose Convention obligations extended over Abkhazia in the period examined, and it leaves title untouched, because ground taken and held by force does not ripen into sovereignty. The conclusion for the period after 10 October 2008 rests on the two facts the Court named, the strong Russian presence and the dependency of the Abkhazian authorities, so what is established is an inference from presence and dependency rather than a finding that Abkhaz decisions are taken in Moscow.

The same judgment shows how narrowly the Court worked. It held by eleven votes to

six that the events of the active phase of hostilities, from 8 to 12 August 2008, fell outside Russian jurisdiction, because armed confrontation between opposing forces in a context of chaos leaves no party in effective control of the ground, and it declared that part of the application inadmissible while recording that international humanitarian law continued to bind in such conditions. The substance of those five days was therefore never examined under the Convention. What the Court did hold, unanimously, is that Russia bore a procedural obligation to investigate those events as well as the events that followed the ceasefire, and it found by sixteen votes to one a violation of Article 2 in its procedural aspect. Neither judgment is a criminal verdict against any person.

One passage of the 2021 judgment runs directly to the terms on which recognition is extended here. The Court recorded that the de facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities, and the Russian Federation which had effective control over those regions, had a duty under the Convention to enable inhabitants of Georgian origin to return to their respective homes. The violation was then found against Russia, because Russia was the respondent state, and the sums awarded in 2025 fall on Russia even where the detentions were carried out by de facto Abkhaz forces. Execution is supervised by the Committee of Ministers against Russia, which remains bound by Article 46 to implement judgments concerning facts occurring before 16 September 2022, the date on which it ceased to be a signatory. Naming the authority that owes the duty and reaching it are different operations, and Strasbourg has performed only the first. Recognition is what lets Kaharagia state the same duty to the administration that governs Gali, and the reservations below state it.

The treaty architecture is extensive and its content is not in dispute. The Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia was signed at Sochi on 24 November 2014 and covers defence, security, the economy and social and humanitarian affairs. An agreement on a combined group of forces followed, ratified by the Abkhaz assembly on 18 December 2015 by twenty-six votes to one with two abstentions, providing for the formation of that group by the end of 2018. Russian Federation border guards operate on the Abkhaz side of the administrative boundary line, and the Secretary-General and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights record continued surveillance and detentions by them. Abkhazia does not presently enjoy the strategic autonomy expected of a fully sovereign state, and this publication makes no claim that it does.

2.3 What Abkhazia Has Refused, and What the Refusal Cost

Effective control shifts the burden to Abkhazia. DM-2026-001 fixes four indicators for testing whether an entity under such control still decides for itself. They were settled before this case was examined and they can produce an unwelcome result.

- **Whether the claim predates the patron.** It does. The Abkhaz side negotiated as a party to a United Nations settlement process in 1994 and signed instruments in its own name, fourteen years before any state recognised Abkhazia and fourteen years before the war that produced the present configuration. The proof of it is a document Georgia itself lodged with the Security Council, and not an Abkhaz account of Abkhaz history.

- **Whether the institutions have refused the patron something the patron wanted.** They have, three times on the record before the Secretariat. In October 2014 Moscow put forward a draft treaty on alliance and integration; it was criticised in Sukhumi, the Abkhaz side put forward its own revised version, and the instrument signed on 24 November 2014 was a treaty on alliance and strategic partnership which reflected most of the Abkhaz proposals. A draft measure on foreign agents introduced in February 2024 was strongly opposed by civil society, was postponed, and has not been reintroduced. On 3 December 2024 the assembly refused to ratify the investment agreement signed with the Russian Federation on 30 October 2024, no member voting in favour.
- **Whether the trajectory runs toward independence or toward incorporation.** No instrument merging Abkhazia into the Russian Federation is before the Secretariat. The comparison that settles the point is with the neighbouring case. South Ossetia signed an Agreement on Alliance and Integration in 2015 and a Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction on 9 May 2026, the second providing for a single economic space, coordinated foreign, defence and security policy and the gradual unification of energy, transport and telecommunications systems. Abkhazia declined the integration treaty and signed a partnership treaty instead. The names of the two instruments are not decoration; they record what each entity was able to refuse.
- **Whether the argument against the patron can be made and survived.** It can. Mass protests against the investment agreement led to the resignation of the incumbent president in November 2024. The assembly then rejected the agreement. At the presidential election that followed, held on 15 February 2025 with a second round on 1 March 2025, Badra Gunba was elected with 54.73 per cent against 41.54 per cent for the opposition leader Adgur Ardzinba. A president removed by protest, a patron's treaty refused by vote and a runoff in which the opposition took more than two fifths of the poll are not the marks of an administration whose decisions are made for it elsewhere.

The refusal was real and it was expensive, and a publication that reports only the refusal has told half the story. After the vote of 3 December 2024 Russian financial assistance was suspended and electricity supplies were cut. Humanitarian electricity deliveries began late that month at the request of the acting president. Following his visit to Moscow in February 2025, 343 million roubles were transferred to fund public-sector salaries and full electricity supply was restored on 7 February 2025. The candidate who won the election had pledged to revise the agreement's format rather than abandon investment, and in his address to the assembly on 26 December 2025 the president described strategic partnership with the Russian Federation as the cornerstone of national security and foreign policy while renewing calls for a legally binding non-use-of-force agreement with Georgia.

That sequence is what the doctrine describes as dependency operating under effective control, and not as absorption. The institutions refused, bore a cost they proved able to bear, and negotiated afterwards from a position they chose. The burden is discharged far enough to support recognition of a state. It is not discharged far enough to support the exchange of representatives, because the matters on which effective control was

found are the military presence and the administration of the boundary, and neither has passed to Abkhaz decision on any material the Secretariat has seen: Russian border guards still stand on the Abkhaz side of the line, and people are still detained there. Recognition with reservations answers a partly met test: recognise the state, recognise no Russian right of tutelage over it, and withhold the exchange of representatives until Abkhazia can maintain a channel that is not routed through Moscow and can show progress on rights and return. DM-2026-008 records the same gap on the same matters and treats it as a sufficient ground on the merits for withholding recognition of a state. What carries this case past that point is the indicator asking whether the institutions have refused their patron: here the refusals are on the record and were paid for, and no such refusal is recorded in the Cypriot file.

3. The Case Against Recognising Abkhazia, Answered

Abkhazia as it exists is a state whose population is the population that remained after ethnic Georgians were driven out. Recognising it gives legal standing to the result of an expulsion. A doctrine that forbids demographic manufacture in principle and recognises this state in practice has, on that view, surrendered the point and kept the vocabulary.

Recognition is not a grant. Statehood is not a prize bestowed by other governments, and non-recognition does not erase a people. Withholding Kaharagian recognition would not return one displaced family or restore one house. The rule the objection invokes targets a specific fallacy: a vote taken among a population produced by expulsion, invoked as proof of free choice. Kaharagia does not rely on that inference, and the reservations forbid anyone from making it on Kaharagia's behalf.

The objection must also answer for its own consequence. Non-recognition leaves Abkhazia's status to be settled between Tbilisi and Moscow, with the Abkhaz on neither side of that table. A displaced Georgian family has a claim against a state that Kaharagia holds to obligations. It has none at all against a fact that Kaharagia declines to name. More than 45,000 people have already returned to their homes in the Gali district. Their position is governed by an authority whose obligations towards them Kaharagia can now state and test.

Part of the objection survives, and this publication says so. Recognition makes Abkhazia's separation harder to reverse, and for anyone whose remedy was the restoration of Georgian administration that is a real loss. Kaharagia's position is that the remedy available lies in return, property and participation. A government in Tbilisi is reachable only through a war fought on the victims' behalf. That is a judgement about which remedies exist, not a claim that the wrong was smaller than they say.

3.1 Whether Recognition Serves Moscow

The objection is that recognition places Kaharagia in the same column as the Russian Federation. The answer lies in the content of the act. Kaharagia recognises Abkhazia as an Abkhazian state and declares, in the same instrument, that it recognises no Russian sovereignty, annexation right, exclusive security right or permanent right to direct

Abkhaz foreign policy. That is the position Russian policy exists to prevent, because it makes Abkhaz independence assertable against Moscow as well as against Tbilisi.

The doctrine also warns against the indiscriminate label of puppet state. To call every Abkhaz official or citizen a Russian proxy would be a false statement about people, made for the convenience of a conclusion, and the record refutes it. A population that filled the streets against a treaty its patron wanted, and an assembly that then refused to ratify it while the electricity was going off, is not a population without a will. Kaharagia records that the European Union has reported a Russian grant scheme of 5.5 million euros directed at Abkhaz civil society organisations as alternative funding diminishes, and treats the reduction of independent civic capacity as a matter for the review conditions rather than as a reason to describe Abkhaz society as an instrument.

3.2 Where the Abkhaz Record Differs From the Other Cases

DM-2026-003 defers recognition of South Ossetia. The test is identical; the evidence is not. South Ossetia is more deeply integrated into Russian military, economic, citizenship and administrative systems than Abkhazia, and the integration is still accelerating: the treaty signed on 9 May 2026 and ratified that month provides for a single economic space and the gradual unification of energy, transport and telecommunications. One live Ossetian option is union with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation, and the state that would receive the territory already controls its security environment. A choice cannot be measured when the favoured outcome is administered by the party in possession. Deferral there holds a status process open. Deferral here would open nothing.

DM-2026-004 withholds recognition from Transnistria because official votes carry little evidentiary weight where economic power is concentrated, media restricted and dissent unsafe. The Abkhaz record contains a president removed by protest, a treaty refused by the assembly and an opposition candidate taking more than two fifths of a runoff, which is the opposite kind of evidence. That concerns the demonstrability of an independent political will. It is not a finding that Abkhaz political life meets any particular democratic standard, and none is made here.

DM-2026-008 declines to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the difference is one of legal form as well as fact. There the Security Council considered the 1983 declaration legally invalid and called upon all States not to recognise any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus, which engages a duty that cannot be cured by attaching reservations. The Council's Abkhaz resolutions reaffirm Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity and call for the status of Abkhazia to be defined accordingly, and Kaharagia does not conceal that this is the strongest instrument against the position adopted here. They do not call upon States to withhold recognition. A reaffirmation of territorial integrity engages discretion; a call for non-recognition displaces it. Where no such process is live, deferral is not neutrality; it leaves the question to whoever holds the ground.

Kosovo cannot be borrowed in either direction: DM-2026-005 refuses to let it serve as a precedent, and its record of United Nations administration, failed status negotiations and an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice is not the Abkhaz record. Somaliland is recognised in DM-2026-007 on grounds Abkhazia cannot claim: a

former protectorate boundary and a union it entered voluntarily. Its reservation is territorial; this one concerns people. Western Sahara is the closest parallel. DM-2026-006 refuses to let an influx of settlers manufacture title against a colonised people; this publication refuses to let an expulsion manufacture an electorate.

3.3 Atrocity, Accountability and the Character of These Findings

A principled recognition policy must be able to name both sets of crimes without using one to erase the other. The principal contemporaneous record in these authorities is a non-governmental investigation published in 1995, documenting violations of the laws of war by more than one party. That is evidence, not adjudication. The judgments of the Strasbourg Court are judgments of a human rights court allocating state responsibility under a treaty, and they are not criminal verdicts. No competent criminal court has entered judgment on the conduct of the 1992–1993 war.

The parties themselves settled the principle in 1994. In the declaration of 4 April 1994 the Georgian and Abkhaz sides recorded that there is no statute of limitations applicable to war crimes, and agreed to intensify efforts to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious criminal offences as defined by international and national law and to bring the perpetrators to justice. That undertaking has not been performed by either side. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights records that no one has been held accountable for the deaths in Abkhazia and South Ossetia of David Basharuli in 2014, Giga Otkhozoria in 2016, Archil Tatunashvili in 2018, Irakli Kvaratskhelia in 2019 and Tamaz Ginturi in 2023. The International Committee of the Red Cross reported that as at December 2025 the remains of 323 persons missing in relation to the armed conflicts of the 1990s and of 2008 had been recovered, identified and returned to their families, and that 1,848 persons remain unaccounted for.

A Diplomatic Memorandum may reach a reasoned governmental conclusion that crimes were committed. It may not present that conclusion as a criminal conviction where no competent court has entered judgment, and it names no individual as responsible. Kaharagia determines that grave violations occurred and that more than one party committed them, and determines nothing about the responsibility of any person. Recognition grants no immunity to leaders or institutions. Kaharagia supports impartial investigation, the work on missing persons, and remedy for victims of every community, and treats that work as owed to families rather than as a bargaining position.

4. The Terms on Which Kaharagia Recognises Abkhazia

An independent Abkhazia cannot be conceived as the exclusive possession of one ethnic group. Abkhaz, Georgians, Armenians, Russians, Greeks and others have legitimate connections to the territory. Recognition is conditioned upon equal citizenship, secure language and education rights, freedom of religion, fair access to public employment, and effective local government in areas with concentrated communities. That requirement is not imported. The General Assembly resolution most adverse to the Abkhaz claim, resolution 62/249, itself emphasised that the rights of the Abkhaz

population living in Abkhazia have to be protected and guaranteed. The rule runs in both directions or it is not a rule.

Documentation is where an abstract guarantee becomes a practical one, and the Abkhaz record on documentation is the clearest reason relations are withheld. Since December 2016 the authorities in control have operated a foreign resident permit, and since 2016 ethnic Georgians residing in the Gali district have been required to register as foreigners in order to obtain one. The Secretary-General records that the permit does not grant its holder the full range of political, housing, land and property rights, that its eligibility requirements exclude a considerable number of people including potential future returnees, and that the grounds for rejection are broad and open to interpretation. Following amendments to the law on citizenship adopted in 2013 and 2018, the majority of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia no longer meet the criteria for the version of the Abkhaz passport issued since 2016, and holders of passports issued before 2016 have been barred since 1 January 2019 from crossing the administrative boundary line. The Office of the High Commissioner records processing times of approximately six to nine months, and that those who lack the documents, including teachers and students, are barred from crossing. A resident whose status is renewable at an official's discretion is not an equal citizen, whatever the constitution provides.

Citizenship rules must not force residents to choose between basic rights and the abandonment of identity, and the reported practice runs against that limit at both ends. The Government of Georgia informed the Office of the High Commissioner that residents of the Gali district face obstacles in registering property if they decline to relinquish their Georgian citizenship, and that in some cases ethnic Georgians there have had to change their surnames to Abkhaz ones and register their ethnic identity as Abkhaz in order to enjoy the full range of their rights. Those are the assertions of a government with an interest in the question and not the findings of a court, and Kaharagia records them as such. Kaharagia also records that they describe precisely the conduct that recognition is expressly refused as cover for. Russian passportisation cannot substitute for an inclusive Abkhaz citizenship, and neither can the erasure of a name.

Property is the second place where the reservations have work to do. The title to an estimated 40 to 50 per cent of all real estate in Abkhazia is not properly documented, which exposes residents of every community to eviction, secondary occupation and protracted dispute. Against that background, amendments to the Abkhaz civil code adopted on 9 July 2025 extended an existing bar. Persons directly involved in acts deemed to undermine the claimed sovereignty of Abkhazia, including participation in the 1992–1993 conflict, were already barred from inheriting property. The revised provisions extend that bar to the family members of such persons, regardless of nationality or legal status. A rule that disinherits the relatives of the defeated is a rule about ethnicity written in the language of loyalty, and Kaharagia states plainly that this measure is incompatible with the terms on which recognition is extended.

Language and schooling are the third. The phased replacement of Georgian with Russian as the language of instruction in schools in the Gali district was completed in 2021. The Government of Georgia reports that more than 4,000 schoolchildren and approximately 600 kindergarten-aged children are consequently taught in Russian, that around 200 schoolchildren permanently left the Gali district at the end of the

2023/24 school year, and that enrolment in the district's schools fell from 3,348 to 3,169 in the following year. It further reports that ethnic Georgian teachers have faced threats, dismissal and replacement, and that ethnic Georgian principals have already been replaced in at least nine schools, some resigning after threats of accusations of treason. The Strasbourg Court awarded 20,000,000 euros for the denial of the right to education in Georgian to a group of at least 4,000 people along the two boundary lines. Mother-tongue education is a condition of this recognition and not an aspiration attached to it.

Movement, detention and access complete the picture, and one part of it is to Abkhazia's credit. Two crossing points on the boundary with Tbilisi-controlled territory are operational, at the Enguri bridge and at Saberio-Pakhulani; four others remain closed, extending travel times for residents of adjacent villages and particularly affecting older people and those needing medical care. The Government of Georgia reports arbitrary closures and unjustified fees charged for transporting goods or passengers across the Enguri bridge, which is conduct the Abkhaz side undertook in 1994 to prevent. For 2025 the Government of Georgia recorded 40 people detained in Abkhazia, with 7 still deprived of liberty at the end of the year. Against that, the authorities in control in Abkhazia maintained limited access for some United Nations development and humanitarian entities throughout 2025, at a time when no international organisation other than the International Committee of the Red Cross could enter South Ossetia at all. That difference is real, it is to be built upon, and it does not answer the request for access which the Office of the High Commissioner sent on 21 October 2025 and to which no reply was received.

4.1 Recognition Without a Mission in Sukhumi

Under the Sovereign instrument giving effect to this determination, Kaharagia recognises Abkhazia under its own constitutional name and treats Sukhumi as its seat of government. It treats Abkhazia as a state in its terminology and its legal analysis, and the incumbent authorities as the *de facto* administration for practical purposes. It holds that the Russian Federation possesses no sovereign, annexationist or tutelary right over Abkhazia.

No mission opens and no representative is accredited. Recognition does not settle the acceptance of Abkhaz travel or civil documents, entry, procurement or treaty relations, each of which requires its own decision. It validates no treaty obtained under conditions of dependence, and it determines nothing about boundaries, since effective control over a line is not sovereign title to it. Diplomatic relations remain unestablished until the Abkhaz authorities demonstrate a practical capacity to conduct relations independently and accept a rights framework consistent with this publication. Humanitarian, cultural and technical contact may occur in the meantime, is expressly without prejudice to the questions this publication leaves open, and is not to be represented by any party as more than it is.

4.2 What Recognition Does Not Authorise

Recognition is addressed to a state. It grants no latitude against anyone living in the territory or displaced from it. It does not authorise:

- The expulsion, denationalisation, dispossession or collective punishment of any community in Abkhazia, including Georgians, Armenians, Russians and Greeks.
- The treatment of residence, documentation, language or schooling in the Gali district as a matter of official discretion or as a lever against a community, or the conditioning of property registration, pension entitlement or civil status on the surrender of another citizenship or the alteration of a name.
- The treatment of displaced persons or their descendants as having forfeited return, property, compensation or participation through the passage of time, or the extension of any disqualification from inheritance to the family members of persons involved in the conflict.
- The acquisition of property in Abkhazia in violation of the rights of returnees, which the General Assembly has called upon Member States to deter among persons under their jurisdiction, and which Kaharagia deters accordingly.
- The use of force by Georgia to restore control, or the absorption, annexation or incorporation of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation.
- Reprisals against Georgians in Abkhazia, or against Abkhaz communities elsewhere, prompted by this decision or by another state's grant or withdrawal of recognition.

4.3 Scope and Reservations of Recognition

Recognition is accompanied by the following declarations:

- Kaharagia recognises Abkhazia as a state and recognises the Abkhaz people's right to an independent political future.
- Kaharagia does not recognise Russian sovereignty, annexation rights, exclusive security rights, or any permanent right to direct Abkhaz foreign policy.
- Recognition is without prejudice to a negotiated boundary with Georgia or to the status of communities whose local affiliation remains disputed.
- Recognition does not extinguish the right of displaced persons and their descendants to return, restitution, compensation, citizenship or residency, and political participation, and may not be pleaded against the obligations the Abkhaz side accepted in the Quadripartite Agreement of 4 April 1994.
- Kaharagia expects constitutional guarantees for Georgian, Armenian, Russian and other communities, including language, education, religion, local government, and equal protection.
- Kaharagia does not establish diplomatic relations by this act. Relations fall to be considered when Abkhazia can maintain an official channel independent of Russian direction and demonstrate progress on rights and return.

5. What Would Justify Relations With Sukhumi, and What Would Not

These are the conditions against which the withheld decision is measured:

- An internationally monitored programme for safe, voluntary and dignified return, restitution and compensation, without imposing collective return or collective exclusion, and the development of the timetable the General Assembly has called for since 2008.
- A documentation regime under which lawful residence, property registration, pension entitlement and freedom of movement do not depend on ethnicity, on the surrender of another citizenship, or on official discretion, and under which the bar on inheritance introduced in July 2025 is repealed.
- Mother-tongue education restored as a right in the Gali district, with teachers and principals protected from dismissal or prosecution on account of their community.
- The reopening of the closed crossing points, the end of arbitrary closures and unauthorised charges, the resumption of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism in Gali without preconditions, and unimpeded access for international and regional human rights bodies, including the access sought by the Office of the High Commissioner in October 2025.
- Transparent review of Russian military basing, border administration, security services and treaties, with an Abkhaz right to alter or terminate them.
- Credible elections and media pluralism open to positions favouring independence, association, neutrality or another peaceful status, and an independent civic sector not dependent on a single foreign funder.
- A binding renunciation of annexation by any state and a commitment to settle outstanding questions with Georgia peacefully, of which a legally binding non-use-of-force agreement would be the natural first instrument.

DM-2026-001 forbids conditions that no addressee could meet, so Kaharagia records to whom each is addressed. Documentation, education, inheritance, crossing points, access and the conduct of elections are addressed to the authorities in Sukhumi, and every one of them is within their power. The withdrawal or consensual regulation of foreign forces and the end of detentions at the boundary line are addressed to the Russian Federation. The renunciation of force and the terms of any negotiated settlement are addressed to Georgia. A supervised return programme is addressed to the states and organisations capable of convening one. The list is deliberately weighted toward the first group, because a condition addressed to nobody is a refusal wearing the language of encouragement.

5.1 Nauru's 2026 Reversal

On 30 July 2026 the Government of the Republic of Nauru announced that it had withdrawn its recognition of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia as independent States and terminated diplomatic relations with both with immediate effect. The media release supplied no reason. Reporting records that four United Nations member states recognise Abkhazia after that decision, and that the Abkhaz foreign ministry attributed the withdrawal to external pressure. Kaharagia does not adopt that characterisation, which is an assertion by an interested party.

A withdrawal by one state alters no fact on which statehood depends. DM-2026-001

states the rule: recognition is not a poll, and the number of states recognising an entity, the identity of the most recent to do so and any later withdrawal are facts about those states rather than answers to the question the doctrine asks. A small state's recognition policy is credible only when grounded in published principles rather than diplomatic purchase or pressure. That constraint binds Kaharagia in both directions. It forbids recognising Abkhazia because a patron would be pleased, and withholding recognition because withholding is cheaper.

ABKHAZIAN PRINCIPLE

Kaharagia recognises Abkhazia only as an Abkhazian state: independent of Georgia, independent of Russia, and bound to protect every community whose home is in Abkhazia.

6. Review and Reversibility

Review follows DM-2026-001. Reviewability is what holds this recognition to the reservations attached to it, and the doctrine permits recognition to be suspended, qualified or withdrawn where an entity ceases to be independent, is annexed, or was recognised on materially false premises.

Any step towards the incorporation or annexation of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation reopens this determination. So do the transfer of decisive state functions such that the capacity to refuse is no longer exercised, the closure of return, restitution or participation as practical possibilities, the systematic exclusion of Georgian, Armenian, Russian or other communities from equal citizenship, and any freely expressed decision of the Abkhaz people in favour of a different status. The annual report of the Secretary-General on the status of internally displaced persons and refugees, the annual report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on cooperation with Georgia, and the rounds of the Geneva International Discussions fix the ordinary occasions for review.

7. Operative Declaration

The State of Kaharagia recognises that the Abkhaz people possess the right freely to determine their political status. It recognises the Republic of Abkhazia as a sovereign state, without recognising any claim of the Russian Federation to control, absorb, or direct that state. Such recognition is without prejudice to the rights of refugees and displaced persons, the restoration or compensation of property, the protection of all communities, and the peaceful determination of boundaries. Diplomatic relations are not established by this instrument.

8. Publication and Legal Effect

This memorandum is a public statement of the foreign policy of the State of Kaharagia, adopted by the Sovereign and issued through the Secretariat of State, Section II. Under Kaharagian constitutional practice, the recognition or non-recognition of a state, the recognition of a government, the establishment of a diplomatic mission, the imposition of sanctions and the entry into formal diplomatic relations remain decisions

reserved to the Sovereign and implemented through the appropriate instrument. A Diplomatic Memorandum states the grounds, scope, reservations and consequences of a policy; it does not by itself confer accreditation, immunity or privilege.

This memorandum is published in the Diplomatic Memorandum Series by the Office of the Sovereign's Printer. Its serial reference is preserved in every separate or electronic edition. Organs of State conform their terminology, publications, procurement, entry decisions and official contact to the determinations recorded here. Material changes in facts, control, legal proceedings or the formally expressed position of the people concerned trigger review. Every authority listed below was retrieved and read when this edition was prepared, save where the entry states otherwise and says what was done instead.

Selected Authorities and Official Materials

Authorities were verified when this edition was prepared, each against the issuing body's own publication except where the entry states otherwise. Titles are followed by the issuing body, the date and a source link. Judgments of human rights courts, resolutions of the General Assembly, decisions of the Security Council, agreements between the parties to the conflict, governmental submissions, non-governmental investigations and press reporting are identified according to their actual character, and none is described as more than it is. Where an address previously held for an authority failed or misdescribed its source, the entry records the failure and gives the address at which the document was obtained.

1. *Judgment in the case concerning the armed conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation in August 2008 and its consequences.* European Court of Human Rights, press release ECHR 028 (2021) issued by the Registrar, 21 January 2021; Grand Chamber judgment of the same date, application no. 38263/08, recorded as final under Article 44 of the Convention. Records the holding by eleven votes to six that the events of the active phase of hostilities from 8 to 12 August 2008 did not fall within Russian jurisdiction, because armed confrontation in a context of chaos leaves no effective control over the area, that part of the application being declared inadmissible while international humanitarian law continued to apply; effective control over South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the buffer zone from 12 August to 10 October 2008, the date of the official withdrawal of Russian troops; that thereafter the strong Russian presence and the South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities' dependency on the Russian Federation indicated continued effective control; that by sixteen votes to one Georgian nationals prevented from returning to South Ossetia or Abkhazia fell within Russian jurisdiction; that by sixteen votes to one there had been an administrative practice contrary to Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 as regards their inability to return, still ongoing on 23 May 2018, the date of the hearing on the merits; that the de facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities, and the Russian Federation which had effective control over those regions, had a duty under the Convention to enable inhabitants of Georgian origin to return to their respective homes; and that Russia bore a procedural obligation under Article 2 to investigate the events of the active phase as well as those following the ceasefire, breached by sixteen votes to one. A judgment of a human rights court, not a criminal verdict. The address previously held for this authority at the Council of Europe returned HTTP 403; the text was obtained from the Court's own press archive.
[https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-6913071-9285190&filename=Grand+Chamber+judgment+in+the+case+Georgia+v.+Russia+\(II\).pdf](https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-6913071-9285190&filename=Grand+Chamber+judgment+in+the+case+Georgia+v.+Russia+(II).pdf)
2. *Russia must pay Georgia over 253 million euros for breaches of human rights caused by hardening of boundary lines after 2008 conflict.* European Court of Human Rights, press release ECHR 237 (2025) issued by the Registrar, 14 October 2025; Georgia v. Russia (IV), application no. 39611/18, lodged 22 August 2018. Records the principal judgment of 9 April 2024 finding a pattern or system of violations arising from the hardening of the administrative boundary lines with Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 conflict, comprising excessive use of force, ill-treatment, unlawful detention, unlawful restrictions on movement across the boundary line and on access to homes, land and

families, and denial of the right to education in Georgian; the unanimous award on just satisfaction of 253,018,000 euros for at least 29,746 victims, including 5,172,000 euros for the unlawful detention of at least 2,586 ethnic Georgians by Russian or de facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian forces, 224,250,000 euros for restrictions on access to homes, land and families affecting at least 23,000 people, and 20,000,000 euros for the denial of education in Georgian to at least 4,000 people; that the Russian Government did not participate in the just satisfaction proceedings, so that the Court based its findings on the documents submitted by the Georgian Government after satisfying itself that the claims were substantiated; that the Georgian Government is to set up a mechanism to distribute the sums to individual victims within eighteen months of payment; and that the Committee of Ministers continues to supervise enforcement against Russia, which remains bound under Article 46 to implement judgments concerning facts occurring before 16 September 2022, the date on which it ceased to be a signatory. Given by a Chamber of seven judges; the Registrar records that under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention a Chamber judgment is not final on delivery, that any party may request referral to the Grand Chamber within three months, that a panel of five judges considers whether the case deserves further examination, and that a refused request makes the Chamber judgment final on that day. The previously held entry described this case as concerning continued effective control; that description was wrong and has been corrected. The title previously given here was taken from the file name of the document rather than from the headline the Registry printed, and has been replaced with that headline, in the form used in DM-2026-003.

[https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-8355578-11797780&filename=Judgment+Georgia+v.+Russia+\(IV\)+--+Russia+must+pay+Georgia+over+253+million+euros+in+just+satisfaction.pdf](https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-8355578-11797780&filename=Judgment+Georgia+v.+Russia+(IV)+--+Russia+must+pay+Georgia+over+253+million+euros+in+just+satisfaction.pdf)

3. *Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia*. United Nations General Assembly resolution 80/264, adopted at the 88th plenary meeting on 4 June 2026 without reference to a Main Committee on draft A/80/L.73. Paragraph 1 recognises the right of return of all internally displaced persons and refugees and their descendants, regardless of ethnicity, to their homes throughout Georgia, including in Abkhazia; paragraph 2 stresses the need to respect their property rights and to refrain from obtaining property in violation of those rights; paragraph 3 reaffirms the unacceptability of forced demographic changes; paragraph 6 underlines the need for a timetable for return. A recommendation of the General Assembly. The address previously held for this authority served only a session index.
<https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A/RES/80/264&l=E&t=pdf>
4. *General Assembly Adopts Text on Status of Internally Displaced Persons, Refugees from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia*. United Nations Meetings Coverage GA/12763, 4 June 2026. Records adoption by a recorded vote of 107 in favour to 8 against, with 55 abstentions.
<https://press.un.org/en/2026/ga12763.doc.htm>
5. *Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia: report of the Secretary-General (A/80/729)*. United Nations, 4 May 2026, covering 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026. Records 300,439 registered internally displaced persons in Georgia as at January 2026; that more than 45,000 people have previously returned to their homes in the Gali district; that the authorities in control in Abkhazia continue to deny return to areas of origin outside the Gali, Ochamchire and Tkvarcheli districts; the foreign resident permit regime and its limits; that following amendments to the law on citizenship adopted in 2013 and 2018 the majority of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia no longer meet the criteria for the passport issued since 2016; the bar since 1 January 2019 on crossing with pre-2016 passports; sixty-six rounds of the Geneva International Discussions and the continuing walkouts in Working Group II; that return cannot be directly linked to political questions and must be addressed irrespective of any solution to the underlying conflict; and the requirement since October 2019 that all passports other than those of the Russian Federation be stamped.
<https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A/80/729&l=E&t=pdf>
6. *Cooperation with Georgia: report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/62/58)*. United Nations, 27 April 2026, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 60/29 and covering 1 January to 31 December 2025. Records the unanswered request for access sent to the authorities in control on 21 October 2025; that those authorities in Abkhazia maintained limited access for some United Nations entities while no organisation other than the International Committee of the Red Cross could enter South Ossetia; two operational crossing points with four others closed;

arbitrary closures and unjustified fees as reported by the Government of Georgia; the foreign residence permit requirement in Gali and processing times of six to nine months; the Government of Georgia's submissions on property registration conditioned on relinquishing Georgian citizenship and on changes of surname and registered ethnicity; that title to an estimated 40 to 50 per cent of real estate in Abkhazia is not properly documented; the civil code amendments of 9 July 2025 extending the bar on inheritance to family members; the completion in 2021 of the replacement of Georgian by Russian as the language of instruction in Gali; school enrolment falling from 3,348 to 3,169 and the replacement of ethnic Georgian principals in at least nine schools; 40 people detained in Abkhazia in 2025 with 7 still held at year end; the postponement of the February 2024 draft measure on foreign agents after civil society opposition; the Russian Federation's grant scheme of 5.5 million euros for Abkhaz civil society organisations, reported by the European Union; the absence of accountability for five named deaths between 2014 and 2023; the suspension of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism in Gali since June 2018; and the International Committee of the Red Cross figures of 323 sets of remains returned and 1,848 persons unaccounted for as at December 2025.

<https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A/HRC/62/58&l=E&t=pdf>

7. *Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia*. United Nations General Assembly resolution 62/249, adopted at the 97th plenary meeting on 15 May 2008. Recalls the conclusions of the Budapest (1994), Lisbon (1996) and Istanbul (1999) summits of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, in particular the reports of "ethnic cleansing" and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in Abkhazia; records deep concern at the humanitarian situation created by the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of persons from Abkhazia; emphasises that the rights of the Abkhaz population living in Abkhazia have to be protected and guaranteed; recognises the right of return regardless of ethnicity; and calls upon all Member States to deter persons under their jurisdiction from obtaining property within the territory of Abkhazia in violation of the rights of returnees. A recommendation of the General Assembly.
<https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A/RES/62/249&l=E&t=pdf>
8. *Security Council resolution 1065 (1996)*. United Nations Security Council, adopted at the 3680th meeting, 12 July 1996. Reaffirms the commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders and the necessity of defining the status of Abkhazia in strict accordance with those principles; expresses deep concern at the continued deadlock in the efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement; reaffirms the right of return set out in the Quadripartite Agreement at S/1994/397, annex II, condemns the continued obstruction of that return by the Abkhaz side, and stresses the unacceptability of any linkage of return with the question of political status; recalls the conclusions of the Budapest summit and affirms the unacceptability of the demographic changes resulting from the conflict; and condemns ethnically motivated killings. A decision of the Security Council. It contains no call upon States to withhold recognition, and no such instrument concerning Abkhazia is before the Secretariat.
[https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/RES/1065\(1996\)&l=E&t=pdf](https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/RES/1065(1996)&l=E&t=pdf)
9. *Letter dated 5 April 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/397)*. United Nations, 5 April 1994. Annex I is the Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict signed on 4 April 1994, whose paragraph 6 provides that Abkhazia shall have its own constitution, legislation and state symbols, whose paragraph 7 records mutual understanding on joint powers in foreign policy and foreign economic ties, border guard arrangements, customs, energy, transport and communications, ecology, and human and civic rights and the rights of national minorities, and whose paragraph 10 records that no statute of limitations applies to war crimes and that the parties agreed to investigate and bring perpetrators to justice. Annex II is the Quadripartite Agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons of the same date, between the Abkhaz and Georgian sides, the Russian Federation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, setting out the rights of return, non-prosecution subject to stated exceptions, freedom of movement, revalidation of documents, protection from harassment and unauthorised fees, restitution or compensation of property, and family reunification, and providing that repatriation would begin with the Gali region.
<https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/1994/397&l=E&t=pdf>
10. *Charter of the United Nations*. United Nations, 1945; Article 1, paragraph 2 on the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and Article 2, paragraph 4 on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any

- state.
<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>
11. *Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia's Role in the Conflict*. Human Rights Watch, March 1995, volume 7 number 7. Non-governmental investigation, not adjudication. Documents indiscriminate attacks, ethnically motivated violence, hostage-taking and pillage by Georgian and by Abkhaz forces, deliberate efforts by each to force out the population of the other party's ethnic group, and approximately 200,000 people displaced, predominantly Georgians, in a mass exodus at the end of 1993.
<https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm>
 12. *Statement by NATO Secretary General on the so-called treaty between the Abkhazia region of Georgia and Russia*. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 24 November 2014. States that NATO does not recognise the so-called treaty on alliance and strategic partnership signed between the Georgian region of Abkhazia and Russia on 24 November, and calls on Russia to reverse its recognition of the two regions and to withdraw its forces from Georgia. Cited for the name and date of the treaty and for the position of the alliance; the address previously held for this authority at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not resolve on three attempts.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_115168.htm
 13. *Moscow, Sokhumi Sign Treaty on 'Alliance and Strategic Partnership'*. Civil Georgia, 24 November 2014. Reporting; records that Russia proposed in October 2014 a draft treaty on "alliance and integration", that the draft was criticised in Sokhumi, that the Abkhaz side put forward its own revised version, and that the text finally approved reflected most of the Abkhaz proposals, while concerns about possible absorption remained within Abkhaz society.
<https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27845>
 14. *Abkhazia parliament ratifies agreement with Russia on combined army group*. TASS, 18 December 2015. Reporting; records ratification by twenty-six votes to one with two abstentions among twenty-nine members present, that the agreement provides for the formation of the combined group by the end of 2018, and that it derives from the Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership signed at Sochi on 24 November 2014.
<https://tass.com/defense/845265>
 15. *Abkhazian Parliament rejects Russian investment agreement*. OC Media, 3 December 2024. Reporting; records the extraordinary session at which twenty-three members were present, nineteen voting against and three abstaining; that the agreement had been signed in Moscow on 30 October 2024 and would have granted Russian entities eight years of property tax exemptions and relief from value added tax and customs duties; that some twenty proposed amendments had not been incorporated; and that the controversy led to the resignations of the president and prime minister.
<https://oc-media.org/abkhazian-parliament-rejects-russian-investment-agreement/>
 16. *Abkhazia Votes to Scrap Russian Investment Deal After Mass Protests*. The Moscow Times, 3 December 2024. Reporting; records the vote as 21 to nil with two abstentions and describes the agreement as providing preferential treatment for investments of two billion roubles and above. The vote counts reported by this outlet and by authority 15 differ; the two agree that no member voted in favour, which is the fact relied on in the body.
<https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/12/03/abkhazia-votes-to-scrap-russian-investment-deal-after-mass-protests-a87215>
 17. *Pro-Russian Candidate Declared Winner in Abkhazia's Presidential Race*. The Moscow Times, 2 March 2025. Reporting; records the second round of 1 March 2025 following a first round on 15 February at which no candidate obtained a majority, Badra Gunba winning with 54.73 per cent against 41.54 per cent for Adgur Ardzinba, and that the election followed the November protests which forced the resignation of Aslan Bzhania.
<https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/03/02/pro-russian-candidate-declared-winner-in-abkhazias-presidential-race-a88219>
 18. *Russia strikes new aid deal with Abkhazia*. Meduza, 7 February 2025. Reporting; records the suspension of Russian financial aid after the rejection of the investment agreement, humanitarian electricity deliveries beginning in late December 2024 at the request of the acting president, the transfer of 343 million roubles to fund public sector salaries and the full restoration of electricity supply from 7 February 2025 following his visit to Moscow, and his pledge to reconsider the format of the investment agreement rather than abandon investment.
<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/02/07/russia-strikes-new-aid-deal-with-abkhazia>

19. *Russia's Plans for Abkhazia are Expanding*. Jamestown Foundation, 25 March 2025. Non-governmental analysis; records the resignation of Aslan Bzhania in November 2024 after protests against an agreement exempting Russian entities from property taxes for eight years, that Russia cut electricity supplies in December 2024 after the agreement was blocked, that humanitarian electricity deliveries began in January 2025, and the election of Badra Gunba on 1 March 2025.
<https://jamestown.org/russias-plans-for-abkhazia-are-expanding/>
20. *President Gunba Addresses Parliament with Broad Reform Programme*. AbkhazWorld, reporting the address of 26 December 2025. Records the description of strategic partnership with the Russian Federation as the cornerstone of national security and foreign policy, Russian financial assistance of 2.919 billion roubles for 2025, humanitarian electricity supplies, and renewed calls for a legally binding non-use-of-force agreement with Georgia. Reporting by an outlet sympathetic to the Abkhaz authorities, cited for the content of a public address.
<https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/3073-president-gunba-addresses-parliament-with-broad-reform-programme>
21. *Government withdraws recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia*. Government of the Republic of Nauru, media release, 30 July 2026. Announces withdrawal of recognition of both as independent States and the termination of diplomatic relations with immediate effect, notes that the countries concerned will be formally notified through diplomatic channels, and gives no reason for the decision.
https://naoero.gov.nr/government-information-office/media-release/media-release-government-withdraws-recognition-of-south-ossetia-and-abkhazia_30jul2026.aspx
22. *A nation of 10,000 people just shrank the list of countries recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia to four*. Meduza, 30 July 2026. Reporting; records that four United Nations member states recognise the two entities after the Nauruan decision, naming Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Syria, that Nauru had established relations in 2009, and that the Abkhaz foreign ministry attributed the withdrawal to external pressure. The attribution is that of an interested party and is recorded as such in the body.
<https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/30/a-nation-of-10-000-people-just-shrank-the-list-of-countries-recognizing-abkhazia-and-south-ossetia-to-four>
23. *A draft law on ratifying a new treaty with South Ossetia has been submitted to the State Duma*. Caucasian Knot, 10 May 2026. Reporting; records the Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction between Russia and South Ossetia signed on 9 May 2026, the explanatory note giving its aims as coordinated foreign, defence and security policy, the movement of capital, goods, services and labour, and the gradual unification of energy, gas transport, transport, communications and telecommunications systems, and records that the 2015 Agreement on Alliance and Integration was signed on 18 March 2015 and entered into force on 30 July 2015. Cited only for the contrast drawn with DM-2026-003.
<https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/75134>



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